From The Wall Street Journal (16/7/2011)
By Aatish Taseer
( Ten days before the father was assassinated in January,)
My father, Salman Taseer, sent out a tweet about an Indian rocket that
had come down over the Bay of Bengal: "Why does India make fools of
themselves messing in space technology? Stick 2 bollywood my
advice."My father was the governor of Punjab, Pakistan's largest province,
and his tweet, with its taunt at India's misfortune, would have
delighted his many thousands of followers. It fed straight into
Pakistan's unhealthy obsession with India, the country from which it was carved
in 1947.Though my father's attitude went down well in
Pakistan, it had caused considerable tension between us. I am half-Indian,
raised in Delhi by my Indian mother: India is a country that I
consider my own. When my father was killed by one of his own bodyguards for
defending a Christian woman accused of blasphemy, we had not spoken for
three years.
My father, Salman Taseer, sent out a tweet about an Indian rocket that
had come down over the Bay of Bengal: "Why does India make fools of
themselves messing in space technology? Stick 2 bollywood my
advice."My father was the governor of Punjab, Pakistan's largest province,
and his tweet, with its taunt at India's misfortune, would have
delighted his many thousands of followers. It fed straight into
Pakistan's unhealthy obsession with India, the country from which it was carved
in 1947.Though my father's attitude went down well in
Pakistan, it had caused considerable tension between us. I am half-Indian,
raised in Delhi by my Indian mother: India is a country that I
consider my own. When my father was killed by one of his own bodyguards for
defending a Christian woman accused of blasphemy, we had not spoken for
three years.
To understand the Pakistani obsession with India, to
get a sense of its special edge & its hysteria, it is necessary
to understand the rejection of India, its culture and past, that lies at
the heart of the idea of Pakistan. This is not merely an academic
question. Pakistan's animus toward India is the cause of both its
unwillingness to fight Islamic extremism and its active complicity in
undermining the aims of its ostensible ally, the United States.The idea
of Pakistan was first seriously formulated by neither a cleric
nor a politician but by a poet. In 1930, Muhammad Iqbal,
addressing the All-India Muslim league, made the case for a state in which
India's Muslims would realize their "political and ethical
essence." Though he was always vague about what the new state would be, he was quite clear about what it would not be: the old pluralistic society of
India, with its composite culture.Iqbal's vision took concrete shape in
August 1947. Despite the partition of British India, it had seemed
at first that there would be no transfer of populations. But
violence erupted, and it quickly became clear that in the new homeland for
India's Muslims, there would be no place for its non-Muslim
communities.
get a sense of its special edge & its hysteria, it is necessary
to understand the rejection of India, its culture and past, that lies at
the heart of the idea of Pakistan. This is not merely an academic
question. Pakistan's animus toward India is the cause of both its
unwillingness to fight Islamic extremism and its active complicity in
undermining the aims of its ostensible ally, the United States.The idea
of Pakistan was first seriously formulated by neither a cleric
nor a politician but by a poet. In 1930, Muhammad Iqbal,
addressing the All-India Muslim league, made the case for a state in which
India's Muslims would realize their "political and ethical
essence." Though he was always vague about what the new state would be, he was quite clear about what it would not be: the old pluralistic society of
India, with its composite culture.Iqbal's vision took concrete shape in
August 1947. Despite the partition of British India, it had seemed
at first that there would be no transfer of populations. But
violence erupted, and it quickly became clear that in the new homeland for
India's Muslims, there would be no place for its non-Muslim
communities.
Pakistan and India came into being at the cost of a million
lives and the largest migration in history.This shared experience of
carnage and loss is the foundation of the modern relationship between
the two countries. In human terms, it meant that each of my
parents, my father in Pakistan and my mother in India, grew up around
symmetrically violent stories of uprooting and homelessness.
lives and the largest migration in history.This shared experience of
carnage and loss is the foundation of the modern relationship between
the two countries. In human terms, it meant that each of my
parents, my father in Pakistan and my mother in India, grew up around
symmetrically violent stories of uprooting and homelessness.
But in Pakistan, the partition had another, deeper meaning. It raised big
questions, in cultural and civilizational terms, about what its
separation from India would mean.In the absence of a true national
identity, Pakistan defined itself by its opposition to India. It turned its
back on all that had been common between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
era before partition. Everything came under suspicion, from dress to
customs to festivals, marriage rituals and literature. The new country
set itself the task of erasing its association with the subcontinent,
an association that many came to view as a contamination.Had
this assertion of national identity meant the casting out of
something alien or foreign in favor of an organic or homegrown
identity, it might have had an empowering effect. What made it
self-wounding, even nihilistic, was that Pakistan, by asserting a new Arabized
Islamic identity, rejected its own local and regional culture. In
trying to turn its back on its shared past with India, Pakistan
turned its back on itself.
questions, in cultural and civilizational terms, about what its
separation from India would mean.In the absence of a true national
identity, Pakistan defined itself by its opposition to India. It turned its
back on all that had been common between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
era before partition. Everything came under suspicion, from dress to
customs to festivals, marriage rituals and literature. The new country
set itself the task of erasing its association with the subcontinent,
an association that many came to view as a contamination.Had
this assertion of national identity meant the casting out of
something alien or foreign in favor of an organic or homegrown
identity, it might have had an empowering effect. What made it
self-wounding, even nihilistic, was that Pakistan, by asserting a new Arabized
Islamic identity, rejected its own local and regional culture. In
trying to turn its back on its shared past with India, Pakistan
turned its back on itself.
But there was one problem: India was just across
the border, and it was still its composite, pluralistic self, a place
where nearly as many Muslims lived as in Pakistan. It was a daily
reminder of the past that Pakistan had tried to erase.Pakistan's
existential confusion made itself apparent in the political turmoil of the
decades after partition. The state failed to perform a single legal
transfer of power; coups were commonplace. And yet, in 1980, my father
would still have felt that the partition had not been a mistake, for
one critical reason: India, for all its democracy and pluralism, was an
economic disaster.Pakistan had better roads, better cars; Pakistani
businesses were thriving; its citizens could take foreign currency
abroad. Compared with starving, socialist India, they were on much
surer ground. So what if India had democracy? It had brought
nothing but drought and famine.
the border, and it was still its composite, pluralistic self, a place
where nearly as many Muslims lived as in Pakistan. It was a daily
reminder of the past that Pakistan had tried to erase.Pakistan's
existential confusion made itself apparent in the political turmoil of the
decades after partition. The state failed to perform a single legal
transfer of power; coups were commonplace. And yet, in 1980, my father
would still have felt that the partition had not been a mistake, for
one critical reason: India, for all its democracy and pluralism, was an
economic disaster.Pakistan had better roads, better cars; Pakistani
businesses were thriving; its citizens could take foreign currency
abroad. Compared with starving, socialist India, they were on much
surer ground. So what if India had democracy? It had brought
nothing but drought and famine.
But in the early 1990s, a reversal began
to occur in the fortunes of the two countries. The advantage that
Pakistan had seemed to enjoy in the years after independence evaporated,
as it became clear that the quest to rid itself of its Indian
identity had come at a price: the emergence of a new and dangerous brand
of Islam.As India rose, thanks to economic liberalization,
Pakistan withered. The country that had begun as a poet's utopia was
reduced to ruin and insolvency.The primary agent of this decline has
been the Pakistani army. The beneficiary of vast amounts of American
assistance and money, $11 billion since 9/11, the military has
diverted a significant amount of these resources to arming itself
against India.
to occur in the fortunes of the two countries. The advantage that
Pakistan had seemed to enjoy in the years after independence evaporated,
as it became clear that the quest to rid itself of its Indian
identity had come at a price: the emergence of a new and dangerous brand
of Islam.As India rose, thanks to economic liberalization,
Pakistan withered. The country that had begun as a poet's utopia was
reduced to ruin and insolvency.The primary agent of this decline has
been the Pakistani army. The beneficiary of vast amounts of American
assistance and money, $11 billion since 9/11, the military has
diverted a significant amount of these resources to arming itself
against India.
In Afghanistan, it has sought neither security nor
stability but rather a backyard, which, once the Americans leave, might
provide Pakistan with "strategic depth" against India.In order to
realize these objectives, the Pakistani army has led the U.S. in a
dance, in which it had to be seen to be fighting the war on terror,
but never so much as to actually win it, for its extension meant the
continuing flow of American money. All this time the army kept alive a
double game, in which some terror was fought and some, such as
Laskhar-e-Tayyba's 2008 attack on Mumbai, actively
supported.The army's duplicity was exposed decisively this May, with the
killing of Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad. It was
only the last and most incriminating charge against an institution
whose activities over the years have included the creation of the
Taliban, the financing of international terrorism and the running of
a lucrative trade in nuclear secrets.This army, whose might
has always been justified by the imaginary threat from India, has been
more harmful to Pakistan than to anybody else.
stability but rather a backyard, which, once the Americans leave, might
provide Pakistan with "strategic depth" against India.In order to
realize these objectives, the Pakistani army has led the U.S. in a
dance, in which it had to be seen to be fighting the war on terror,
but never so much as to actually win it, for its extension meant the
continuing flow of American money. All this time the army kept alive a
double game, in which some terror was fought and some, such as
Laskhar-e-Tayyba's 2008 attack on Mumbai, actively
supported.The army's duplicity was exposed decisively this May, with the
killing of Osama bin Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad. It was
only the last and most incriminating charge against an institution
whose activities over the years have included the creation of the
Taliban, the financing of international terrorism and the running of
a lucrative trade in nuclear secrets.This army, whose might
has always been justified by the imaginary threat from India, has been
more harmful to Pakistan than to anybody else.
It has consumed
annually a quarter of the country's wealth, undermined one civilian
government after another and enriched itself through a range of
economic interests, from bakeries and shopping malls to huge
property holdings.The reversal in the fortunes of the two countries,
India's sudden prosperity and cultural power, seen next to the
calamity of Muhammad Iqbal's unrealized utopia, is what explains the
bitterness of my father's tweet just days before he died. It captures the
rage of being forced to reject a culture of which you feel
effortlessly a part, a culture that Pakistanis, via Bollywood, experience
daily in their homes.This rage is what makes it impossible to reduce
Pakistan's obsession with India to matters of security or a land
dispute in Kashmir. It can heal only when the wounds of 1947 are
healed. And it should provoke no triumphalism in India, for behind the
bluster and the bravado, there is arid pain and sadness.
Mr. Taseer is the author of "Stranger to History: A Son's
Journey Through Islamic Lands." His second novel, "Noon," will be
published in the U.S. in September.
annually a quarter of the country's wealth, undermined one civilian
government after another and enriched itself through a range of
economic interests, from bakeries and shopping malls to huge
property holdings.The reversal in the fortunes of the two countries,
India's sudden prosperity and cultural power, seen next to the
calamity of Muhammad Iqbal's unrealized utopia, is what explains the
bitterness of my father's tweet just days before he died. It captures the
rage of being forced to reject a culture of which you feel
effortlessly a part, a culture that Pakistanis, via Bollywood, experience
daily in their homes.This rage is what makes it impossible to reduce
Pakistan's obsession with India to matters of security or a land
dispute in Kashmir. It can heal only when the wounds of 1947 are
healed. And it should provoke no triumphalism in India, for behind the
bluster and the bravado, there is arid pain and sadness.
Mr. Taseer is the author of "Stranger to History: A Son's
Journey Through Islamic Lands." His second novel, "Noon," will be
published in the U.S. in September.
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